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Abstract
How can healthcare access for Chinese migrants be improved? Migrant workers face two types
of healthcare-access exclusion in the workplace: a financial one (via income) and a legislative one
(from the hukou). We use 2006 data from a survey of rural migrant workers conducted in five of
the most economically-advanced cities. We estimate a fixed-effect probit model, and control for the
non-exogeneity of health insurance. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of a return to
the hometown for migrant workers with poor health. Apart from residency permits and income, the
social integration of migrant workers is also found to be a decisive factor in healthcare access. Policies
tackling migrant healthcare exclusion should thus involve organisations working at the local level, such
as residents’ committees.
Keywords: Healthcare access, Health insurance, Social Capital, China, Migrants.
JEL Classification: D82, H52, I18.
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1 Topic
In China, the rights of individuals are mainly established for the location specified by their permanent
residency permit (”hukou”). However, by definition migrants do not live in the town of their permanent
residency permit where their rights in terms of healthcare access are located. The question of healthcare
access may therefore be an issue for migrants. The growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been
paralleled by an expansion in healthcare expenditures. From under 3 percent of GDP in 1980, these grew
to 5.3 percent in 2000,1 with expenditure on health increasing even more rapidly in urban than in rural
areas. As the percentage of migrants in cities increases, their access to education and healthcare has
become an increasingly central issue in China. This paper deals with healthcare access for these migrant
workers.
On top of their existing 103 Million urban migrants, Chinese cities continue to experience a steady
migration inflow. In terms of health, one consequence is a falling proportion of rural population living in
extreme poverty and improvements in the level of nutrition. Life expectancy at birth in 2002 was 71 years,
which is four years higher than the world average figure (Liu and Yi, 2004). As the disastrous famine
in the late 1950s resulted in high mortality, this current life expectancy figure represents an enormous
improvement within China. Other health indicators such as the infant mortality rate, the under-five
mortality rate, and the maternal mortality rate have also registered improvements.
However, this expansion of healthcare is also mostly unequally distributed. Economic reforms have
had positive effects on GDP and the level of nutrition, but have led to the collapse of the public healthcare
network and universal access to basic healthcare. The result is an increase in healthcare inequality.
Periodically, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranks countries according to the inequality of their
healthcare systems, and in particular their healthcare insurance system. According to the WHO [World
Health Report 2000], the Chinese health sector was ranked close to the bottom in terms of the fairness
of financial contributions, with a rank of 188 out of 191 countries.
There is by now a large body of literature addressing the question of health inequality around the
world (Deaton, 2003). Various methods of analysis have been developed, some making use of advances
in the literature on income distribution and taxation. Work has focused on individual countries as well
as comparing many different countries (Wagstaff et al., 1999). In the case of China, however, there is
very little literature. Bloom and Gu (1997) analyze the causes of the increase in medical care costs, and
the deterioration in preventive programmes in some poor areas. Liu and Mills (2002) also focus on the
1See Figure 1. Source: 1980-1989 data from Hossain (1997); 1990-1994 data from the Institute of Health Economy,
Ministry of Health, 1999; 1995-2000 data from China Statistic Yearbook, 2002.
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reduction in the demand for the use of preventive services. A growing number of papers have considered
the effect of the introduction of the New rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS). Jackson et al.
(2005) compare the introduction of NCMS with the out-of-pocket system in Henan province. Wagstaff et
al. (2009) also analyze the introduction of the NCMS, but for different provinces in China, and provide
an extensive review of this new literature. However, empirical studies on healthcare and migrants have
attracted almost no attention in existing research.
The goal of this paper is therefore to single out the main determinants of healthcare access. We
highlight migrants’ healthcare exclusion due to both income and the hukou. We shed light on the
importance of both material and social capital, or life conditions, for migrant workers in providing
greater access to healthcare. Above all, we provide new evidence on the decisive role of social networks
on migrants’ healthcare access. Two pieces of work in Sociology, Bai and He (2003) and Zhang et
al.(2007), used qualitative methods to underline the effect of health on the decision to return home.
Our empirical findings support the hypothesis of the return home for migrants with health problems.
We are the first to highlight this pattern of exclusion using an empirical strategy and to emphasise the
importance of social networks, the residence registration system and the support of family and relatives
in the outcome of the treatment in compelling migrants to leave the city.
In Section 2, we present the Chinese context. The description of the data and some preliminary
statistics on migrants and healthcare are given Section 3. The econometric model is presented in Section
4. In Sections 5 and 6, we present the first econometric results and explore migrants’ healthcare acess
depending on their health status. Last, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Chinese context
The economic reforms in China have produced remarkable growth in GDP. This growth has been par-
ticularly concentrated in certain areas, mainly the major cities in the Eastern and South-Eastern part of
the country, leading to massive internal migration.
Since the late 1970s, the economic take-off in some urban centers has created a huge demand for labor
in these areas and triggered a wave of migration. The general GDP growth across the country led to
rising labor demand at the local level in most areas, but much less so than that in these industrial centers
(Liang, Chen and Gu, 2002). By 2020, the forecast is that more than 50% of China’s total population
will live in towns and cities. This implies that in coming years about three hundred Million farmers will
leave rural areas. This will be the largest migration of population mankind has ever experienced.
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This internal migration raises a number of issues. One core issue in China is the conflict between the
greater welfare associated with economic reforms and the deterioration of healthcare insurance. While
economic reforms have had positive effects on GDP and the level of nutrition, they have also led to the
collapse of both the public-healthcare network and universal access to basic healthcare. The result has
been an increase in healthcare inequality.
To help understand this degradation, we now present a brief description of the healthcare-insurance
system before the economic reforms and its subsequent evolution. In China, before the economic reforms,
the healthcare-insurance system was not homogeneous. In urban areas, it depended on large state-owned
conglomerates that took care of their workers’ medical needs; healthcare in rural areas was determined
locally. However, out-of-pocket expenses were almost zero whatever the healthcare setup. In urban areas,
the dismantlement of the large state-owned conglomerates led to healthcare supply by smaller-size units.
These units quickly ran into difficulties in financing their own social insurance, as had previously been the
case. There are two main reasons for this: first, they are smaller than before, and so the pooling insurance
is based on a smaller number of individuals; second, they are responsible for the profit (no intervention
of the state) but part of the profit is used for social insurance. Facing the risk of collapse in the economic
framework, the government was forced to react. They introduced a kind of social insurance, but with a
far lower level of coverage than before. In rural areas, farmers were themselves made responsible for social
insurance through a pooling system at the village level. Therefore, the rapid privatization of farming was
de-connected from the financial burden of social insurance for rural inhabitants. Farms were not obliged
to use part of their profits for social insurance, therefore there was no risk of collapse of the agricultural
sector. As such, the government did not have to step in to provide an insurance system for the rural
population as it did for the urban population. The result was the partial, and sometimes complete,
disappearance of the healthcare-insurance system in rural areas.
Living in an urban area does not mean being a urban citizen. Healthcare insurance rights, and
others, depend on a permanent residence registration system, the ”Hukou”. The hukou is determined
by place of birth and family background. There are sharp restrictions on changing from a rural to a
non-rural Hukou, with only few exceptions such as graduating from university and becoming a cadre of
the Communist party. The Hukou, initiated in 1955 requires all residents to live in the place where they
were born and obtain permission to move (Cheng and Selden, 1994). Up to the 1970s, enforcement of
the Hukou policy was very strict and migrants were even transferred back to their villages in order to
prevent over-urbanization. Since the late 1970s, the willingness of the authorities to encourage economic
take-off has led them to be more flexible about the Hukou policy. People from rural areas can now move
to urban areas in order to work with temporary mobility permits. However, labour demand has not
suppressed the ”Hukou”. As these migrants still hold a rural Hukou, they do not have access to urban
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healthcare insurance, but only have access to public services from the place of their residency permit.
The aim is to avoid over-urbanization; however, this limitation does have an impact on healthcare access.
Leaving rural areas therefore does not produce urban dwellers. A survey conducted by Fudan Univer-
sity on 30,000 migrant workers in major Chinese cities revealed that only 7.6% of them are satisfied with
their life in the city, and that 68% are convinced that the city will not accept their integration. [January
14, 2008 China Daily].
There is another element which may also play a role in determining migrants’ healthcare access.
In Chinese hospitals, family and relatives play a crucial role in the treatment and recovery process.
Healthcare providers furnish only minimal accommodation and catering. When someone is at hospital,
relatives have to be present to support the patient through meals and helping with their treatment. The
presence of relatives also affects the way in which hospital staff treat the patient. The presence of family
and relatives in the city can therefore also be a key component of healthcare access in the city.
In theory, migrants are supposed to claim for medical care benefits in the locations where they are
registered. Even if most migrants do not have access to urban health insurance, in some cities like
Shanghai specific health-insurance schemes for migrants have been developed. These local policies are
increasingly frequent in China, but still cover only a small percentage of migrants and the level of coverage
is very low. Hence, the Hukou and the need for family support in hospital push migrants to return to
their place of registration. The Sociology literature, based on hometown surveys, shows this pattern.
Health conditions that reduce the capacity to work (including old age, pregnancy, and recent childbirth)
push migrants to return home to seek family support and to avoid the high medical and living costs in
cities (Bai and He, 2003 ; Zhang et al., 2007; Hua et al., 2008).
To soften the distinction between the insured and the uninsured, we should underline that the level
of coverage is often fairly low even for the insured.
The healthcare system is organized so that hospitals that can treat serious health conditions are only
found in larger cities. For very severe health conditions, migrants can obtain some help from the local
government in their place of work or from the firm. Migrants may thus prefer to stay in the city in order
to obtain adequate healthcare. In this paper, we will therefore distinguish acute health problems from
other types of disease or injury.
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3 Migrants in five big cities
3.1 The survey on five cities
We use data from the Survey of Rural Migrant Workers Health and Social-economic Status in 2006.
This survey was conducted by the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China and
the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The sample is composed
of 2 398 interviewees with health and social-economic status information. Interviewees are rural-urban
migrant workers. Rural-urban migrant workers are defined as workers who migrate from rural areas to
cities. They come from rural areas and have rural hukou: they do not have the permanent city hukou
from the place where they work. As noted above, the type of hukou has serious implications in term of
public-service access, including health insurance. Rural-urban migrant workers are selected by their work
unit. This sample was constructed to be representative of rural-urban migrant workers with a formal job
and in a regular situation. Therefore, this sample is composed of migrants in socio-economic situations
that are called non-critical. The sample excludes migrants with informal jobs and self-employed migrant
workers.
The survey covers fives cities: Chongqing, Dalian, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Wuhan. These five cities
represent five of China’s geographical regions, which all have their own economic characteristics. All five
of these cities have economic indices amongst the highest in the country and contain substantial numbers
of rural migrant workers. Dalian represents Northeast China; Shanghai represents East China and is
the economic hub of the country; Wuhan represents Central China; Shenzhen represents South China
- this city is archetypal of the Pearl River Delta region, the biggest manufacturing base for exports;
Chongqing represents Southwest China and is one of the biggest cities in the country; Northwest China
is less-developed and contains fewer rural migrant workers.
Tables 1 and 2 show the sample characteristics. The average age is about 27 and there are no old
people in the sample, which is typical of Chinese migrant characteristics. Migrants are younger in Dalian
and Shenzhen than in the other three cities. On average, they are older in Shanghai and Chongqing. One
explanation may come from the type of activities that migrants do. In Dalian, Wuhan, Shenzhen and
Chongqing, the sample mainly covers workers in industrial production lines, where the jobs are better-
suited for younger workers. In Shanghai, the sample mainly comes from small companies and service
industries where the physical job requirements may disqualify older migrants. The share of male and
female workers is similar across cities.
In China, compulsory education lasts for nine years. In most provinces, these nine years of education
include six years of primary school (or elementary school) and three years of junior middle school. Most
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children start school at the age of seven. After junior middle school, they can choose to leave the education
system. Beyond junior middle school, there are three types of education: first, senior middle school (and
then high school after passing a national exam); second, vocational middle school; third, technical middle
school. Most migrants come into the labor market after graduating from junior middle school, and some
of them join the labor market after graduating from vocational middle school or technical middle school;
only very few of them come into the labor market after graduating from high school. Dalian has the
greatest variance in terms of the level of education: the smallest percentage of elementary school migrants
and the highest percentage of vocational middle school migrants.
3.2 Health status
Health in this survey is measured by questions on whether health reduces the capacity to work. This
seems apt as Chinese migrants often ignore health problems unless they affect their capacity to work.
These questions were designed by Fan Ming (2002) to rank incapacity or injuries that limit migrants’
labor supply. Following Fan Ming (2002), a health indicator, Health1, is constructed from these objective
health questions which ranks labor-supply limitations for workers. This index is constructed from six
questions, of which five are Yes/No and the other is on a scale from one to five. Each question is weighted.
and our index is given by the weighted sum. The questions and the weights are shown in Figure 2. The
indicator, Health1, takes values from 0 (very good health) to 30 (very poor health conditions limiting
work).
We also add six variables for each of the six health questions. In the following, we call this index
Health2.
Table 3 displays migrants’ health conditions. Globally, the survey of population should be in good
health, as young urban migrants are there to supply labor. In this survey, Wuhan is the city where
migrants have the worst health, and Shanghai the city where migrants are in the best health, independent
of the index that is analyzed.
3.3 Healthcare access
In this paper, we have two sources of information on healthcare expenditure: healthcare expenditures
in the last month and average healthcare expenditures per year. These come from information declared
by the migrant herself. Healthcare expenditures over the last month are commonly used as an index of
healthcare access. However, here, the percentage of individuals with a positive value is very low, and the
results using this variable are open to discussion.2 The second source of information has a number of
2These results are available on request
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advantages: the share of individuals declaring such healthcare expenditures is significant, and expenditure
over a year is a more general measure of healthcare access.
We would like to measure healthcare access itself, i.e. the possibility that a migrant obtain access
to any form of healthcare. As we are not able to obtain a direct measure of this healthcare access, we
set up a proxy using average healthcare expenditures. When any healthcare expenditure is observed,
we consider that the migrant has access to healthcare. The variable HCA* is an unobserved continuous
variable to which the discrete variable HCA is related via the relationship HCA = 1/(HCA∗ > 0).
These health indices measure health conditions that limit the capacity to work. Therefore, a priori,
all of those who answered ”Yes” to at least one of the questions should go to visit a Doctor.3 Table
4 displays the results. Empirically, we see that only few of them actually do carry out this visit. In
the data, 61% of individuals declare a positive average healthcare expenditure figure during the year in
question. Dalian is the city where migrants have the least healthcare access.
3.4 Health insurance
Migrants have to claim for insurance reimbursment in the location where they are subscribed. Here,
health insurance refers to subscribing to health insurance in the city, i.e. the workplace. This insurance
is mainly subscribed by the firm. The term health insurance excludes NCMS insurance, to which migrants
subscribe in their hometown.
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics. The level of insurance varies according to the city. While 80%
of migrants are insured in Dalian, in Chongqing only 18% of migrants are so. In addition, healthcare
access can also depend on having health insurance. In Shanghai and Wuhan, insured individuals have
more healthcare access than do others, while in Dalian, Wuhan and Shenzhen insured individuals have
less healthcare access than others do. Therefore, the effect of insurance does not seem to be unambiguous.
As noted above, there is no national-level health insurance system for migrant workers in China.
Provincial governments and some city governments have their own policies regarding migrants’ health
insurance. The five cities in our survey have their own health-insurance systems according to local
institutions. Specifically, Dalian and Shanghai provide health insurance for migrant workers, with a
scheme different from the regular insurance systems for workers with city hukou. In Shanghai, the
government has a comprehensive social insurance system for migrant workers, including three types of
insurance: health insurance, pensions and work-related injury insurance. At the time of this survey,
3In urban China, people visit Doctors in hospitals. Therefore, in this paper ”to go to the hospital” and ”to visit a Doctor”
mean the same thing
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Shenzhen was in the process of setting up a health insurance system for migrant workers. Wuhan and
Chongqing are different from the other three cities, as there is no health-insurance system for migrant
workers. However, migrant workers in these two cities, as well as in the three others, have the option of
joining the health-insurance system for city workers. There are two main benefits for migrant workers in
subscribing to a migrant health-insurance system rather than to a regular health-insurance system. First,
the fee in the city worker insurance system is higher than that for migrant health insurance; migrant
workers, who earn less than city workers (on average) cannot necessarily afford the higher fee. Second, if a
migrant worker participates in the city worker insurance scheme, she cannot then transfer her insurance
benefits to other cities (or areas). However, we know that one of the key characteristics of Chinese
migrant workers is that they frequently float 4 from one place to another. If they participate in one city’s
insurance scheme, they cannot subsequently transfer their insurance benefits to another location.
From the preliminary statistics, we can see that the city has an effect on healthcare access. We there-
fore use a fixed-effect probit model to explain healthcare access (HCA).5 The Hausman test performed
for each model (each column) supports the fixed-effect assumption.6
4 Estimation
Consider migrant i working in city p. Let HCA be the dependent variable measuring healthcare access.
HCA is a binary variable indicating whether the migrant has access to health care i.e. had positive
healthcare expenditure.
We use a fixed-effect probit model,
P (HCAip = 1|Xip) = G(xipβ), p = 1, ...5. (1)
Here G(.) is a known function taking values in the open unit interval, the subscript i denotes the migrant
and p the city, and xip is a vector of explanatory variables including city dummies. The city dummies
are included to control for city fixed effects.
If unmeasured variables which affect the outcome are also correlated with the migrant’s participa-
tion in health insurance (e.g. unobserved migrant characteristics), the results of the fixed-effect probit
4The term ”floating” may seem rather abusive. Migrants often retain links with their hometown, via having children in
the village, Land Rights there, and so on
5Table 8 displays descriptive statistics for the independent variables.
6The term ”fixed effect probit model” is mainly used when individual fixed effects are considered. Our model can also
be viewed as a probit model with city dummies.
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estimation are likely to be biased. To ensure consistent estimates, we re-estimate (1) employing IV es-
timation using firm-size indices. The migrant’s participation in a health-insurance program will depend
on the firm’s subscription to health insurance, and so on firm characteristics. Controlling for industry
(manufacturing, construction or services), the size of the firm is plausibly uncorrelated with unobserved
individual characteristics. We also have information on firm ownership (State-owned firms, Joint-venture
firms, private Chinese firms, and foreign firms). However, in China, firm ownership is correlated with
healthcare access. State-owned firms often have some agreements with certain hospitals (for instance,
with military hospitals that are on average of better quality), independent of any participation in an
insurance program. Therefore, these variables are not good candidates for IV variables.
The IV model is estimated via MLE. In a preliminary step, we also use the Rivers-Vuong approach
to test for the exogeneity of the migrant’s participation in health insurance. For each model, the test
rejects exogeneity (the results are available on request).
5 First empirical results
In the following, we do not take into account the hukou in the model, as all of the migrants in this survey
are in the same situation: they do not have the permanent ”hukou” to work in the urban area.
We show the results using the health index defined by Fan. The health-status index is recoded
into four groups. However, the results are qualitatively similar when we consider dummy variables for
questions about health (the list of questions appears in Figure 2).
Table 5 displays the results from the econometric model. Migrants’ remittances reduce the migrant’s
net income. We might then expect a negative effect on healthcare access due to lower income. However,
we actually find that migrant remittances increase healthcare access. Healthcare insurance has no positive
and significant effect on healthcare access. Controlling only for demographic variables and the level of
health, we find no effect of insurance on healthcare access, and when we control for income and migrants’
remittances (Table 5, Column 5), we even obtain a negative significant effect. At first sight, this is
worrying. The aim of healthcare insurance is to improve healthcare access.
In Section 2, we explained the possibility of selection bias in the data due to, inter alia, legislative
aspects (the ”hukou” and its consequences).
To test for selection bias is to test for migrant healthcare exclusion, but how can we test for selection
bias? Having insurance does not mean being well-covered. The level of coverage may differ according to
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the type of healthcare and the level of gravity. In China, the level of coverage is often low. Hence, as long
as migrants consider their health condition as not being an issue for doing their job, they may ignore
it. As the degree of gravity worsens, they react, which does not necessarily mean visiting a doctor in
the location where they work; they can instead return to their hometown. They do so partly because in
their hometown they benefit from family support, partly because they also may benefit there from health
insurance. Recall that public-insurance benefits can only be claimed in the locations where migrants are
registered. Migrants are excluded from the health system program set up for urban citizens with the
”right” hukou in their working place.7 Because our survey is conducted in the workplace, these migrants
will therefore not have been interviewed.
While migrants may prefer to return to their hometown for more severe degrees of gravity, there is
another factor which may keep migrants with poor health in cities. As described above, the Chinese
health system is organized in such a way that hospital quality varies with the degree of urbanization,
with cities offering better quality healthcare. After a certain degree of health severity8, staying in the city
may be a better option for migrants, as they there have access to an adequate quality level. Moreover,
the level of co-payment is not so low for more severe health conditions, as municipalities in the working
place and/or firms may also provide some financial subsidies in this situation, independent of the hukou
(the registration permit).
We henceforth propose two models according to the degree of gravity. As the health indices do not
capture lower degrees of severity, one model (Model A) considers migrants with health conditions that do
not require a high degree of quality i.e. with health conditions that do not imply visiting a city hospital;
the second model (Model B) considers migrants with more acute health conditions.910
7As noted, some work on rural areas has suggested that migrants return to their hometowns when they need healthcare
(Bai and He, 2003 ; Zhang et al., 2007).
8When the degree of gravity is severe.
9We examined different thresholds to define Models A and B. We used the third quartile and the ninth decile of the
Health1 variable; these produce very similar results. The results presented here pertain to the third quartile.
10We have no variable to hand to identify migrants who may eventually leave the city in the case of health problems.
However, we know that there is potentially some subset of the population that is not present in our data due to incidental
attrition. Because we only observe X (See Equation (1)) for migrants who stay in the city, and have no information on
migrants who leave the city, the potential selection issue cannot be corrected. However, the comparison of the results for
migrants with different levels of health problems allows us to examine the presence of selection bias.
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6 Healthcare access: A behavior which depends on health status
We present the results according to Fan’s index.11 However, for a given level of this health index, we may
still have within variations in health. In both Models A and B, we thus control for the within variation
in health via the Health2 index. However, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the Health2
index in the regressions.
In this survey, health-insurance subscription is decided by the firm. The results could therefore be
affected by the non-exogeneity of the effect of health insurance on healthcare access. In other words, the
residual may contain an omitted variable that is correlated with health insurance. To resolve this issue,
we have to find at least one instrumental variable that is partially correlated with the health insurance
index once the other exogeneous variables in equation (1) have been controlled for. Here, we propose the
size of the firm (small, medium or large). The results of instrumental-variable estimation are displayed
in Column 6 of each Table.
We therefore deal with the potential non-exogeneity of health insurance, but what about the potential
non-exogeneous effect of NCMS insurance on healthcare access in the city? In China, the system of
insurance is associated with one location. Migrants cannot take insurance benefits to another location.
Because the NCMS is associated with the hometown, NCMS subscription may have an effect on the
decision to return to the hometown, but is not a substitute for the city insurance system. Because we
focus on the workplace (the place where the survey was conducted), the subscription to NCMS insurance
should not be an issue here.12 As noted above, the term health insurance is for subscription to health
insurance in the city, i.e. the workplace.
6.1 Migrants’ exclusion from healthcare access
The results are displayed in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Tables 6 and 7.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 7 display the results of Model B. Regarding the demographic variables, age
is positively associated with healthcare access, and women migrants have better healthcare access than
do men. To control for the severity of work, we include variables for industry and type of firm. Only
working for a State-owned firm has an effect on healthcare access. Before the economic reforms, all those
working in State-owned firms had complete healthcare coverage. The situation now is less clear, as this
access has gradually deteriorated and migrants usually do not have access to this insurance. However,
11We have also considered the unweighted index, which does not change the results
12The results without the NCMS index are unchanged. These are avalaible on request.
12
with the challenge of migrants’ healthcare access, these firms are encouraged to facilite healthcare access
to migrants with more severe health conditions.
The level of income acts as a push factor on healthcare access. The lower is income, the less likely
is the migrant to have healthcare access. The financial domain is then one determinant of migrants’
exclusion from healthcare access.
We here focus on more severe health conditions. The optimal behavior is therefore to stay in the
city in order to benefit from an adequate level of hospital quality. First of all, we find that education,
migrants’ remittances and health insurance all play their expected role: education increases healthcare
access; remitting to the rural family has a negative effect on healthcare access; and insurance positively
and significantly influences healthcare access. Hence, on the sample where we suspect selection to be less
of a problem, we do obtain the expected correlations.
Table 6 displays the results from Model A. First, education has a negative and significant effect
on healthcare access. With Model B, we found that education has a positive and significant effect on
healthcare access. In the light of potential selection, when people have health problems, but not very
severe ones, the higher is the level of education, the more they leave for their hometown. Those who do
not leave the place of work are those who are not excluded from the healthcare system for some reason
that we have not yet identified13 or those who cannot leave. This could be for financial reasons or due
to a lack of family/relatives support in the hometown. As noted above, the term ”floating” for migrants
is sometimes exaggerated. Some of them no longer have any contact with the hometown.
Second, remiting has a positive and significant effect on health care whereas the remittance has a
negative effect on healthcare access in Model B. Migrants who remit are those who have contact with their
hometown. Therefore, these are the ones who leave the place of work when their health is bad enough.
This selection effect therefore leads to a sample with only a small percentage who have healthcare access
and remit. As income plays a strong positive role in healthcare access, those who do not have healthcare
access are the poorest whatever the level of remittance.
Health insurance has a significant negative effect on healthcare access. This effect can also be viewed
as reflecting selection. With Model B, we found a positive effect of health insurance. This result suggests
that the level of coverage for migrants in the working place is not enough to allow them to have healthcare
access in the working place. Therefore, migrants who can afford to return to the hometown and who still
have contacts in the hometown, prefer to return to the hometown.
13We present the determinants in the next Section
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In addition, in Table 4 we can see that the percentage of insured migrants in Dalian is about three
times that in the other cities, and mean health expenditures in Dalian are about 80% higher than those
in the other cities. Even so, migrants have less healthcare access than in the other cities. To control for
any specific Dalian effect, we thus add an interaction variable between the index for being a migrant in
Dalian and being insured. Adding a specific Dalian effect does not change the results. Equally, all of the
models have been re-estimated without the observations from Dalian, which did not change the results.
The selection bias thus appears clearly. Health insurance and education have a negative impact on
healthcare access, whereas remitting induces greater healthcare access. These results are the opposite to
intuition and are the opposite of those in Model B. However, in terms of selection bias these results make
sense. Due to this bias, the subsample of migrants with healthcare access is composed of those who do
not have enough contact with the hometown to return there. Therefore, our empirical findings highlight
two forms of exclusion: i) exclusion for financial reasons - not only can migrants not afford healthcare
access, but neither can they afford to return to their hometown; ii) the results confirm the hypothesis of
exclusion from the healthcare access in the workplace for migrants with bad health.
6.2 Integration in the city
We now add indices of integration in the city to the model (in Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 6 and 7). The
survey includes a number of different questions on life conditions. We introduce expenditures as life-
condition indicators. Specifically, we use clothing, transportation, housing and education expenditures
as proxies for life conditions. With respect to education, the presence of such expenses means that a
child lives with the migrant. In China, the majority of migrants’ children live in the rural area with their
grand-parents. Apart from financial reasons, another consideration is that migrants’ children have no
access to public schools because of the ”hukou”. Individuals only have access to public services from the
town of their residency permit. Therefore, migrants’ children only have access to public schools in the
place where they are registered. Consequently, migrant’s children who live with their parents have to go
to private schools. In addition to the subscription fee, parents have to pay additional fees for not having
the right ”hukou”. Therefore, education expenses are a good proxy for better life conditions. Equally,
spending money on transport says a lot about life conditions. In China, migrants in extreme situations
do not have houses. They live in tents or prefab housing close to their job. Therefore, transportation
expenses suggest that migrants live in better conditions. In conclusion, education and transportation
expenses are proxies for integration in the city .
In Model B (Table 7), all of the expenses have a positive effect on healthcare access except for
transportation expenditures. As noted above, migrants with transportation expenditures are more likely
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to have real accomodation rather than a tent or prefab housing close to their place of work. However,
transportation expenditure necessarily reduces migrants’ disposable income (going to work leads to trans-
portation expenditures). Controlling for income, the type of job and other types of expenditures, this
may explain the negative effect.
We have also introduced control variables for the type of work contract and ownership of durable
goods: motorbike, bicycle, VCD/DVD, TV, washing machine, mobile phone, microwave or oven, refrig-
erator, gas stove and computer. Controlling for social capital and expenditures, these new variables have
no impact on healthcare access. Moreover, we have information on family structure, but this has no effect
on migrants’ healthcare access either.14
With respect to the social network, we appeal to information on the presence of networks, the number
of acquaintances or friends, and the way in which the migrant obtained her job. Having friends or
acquaintances and being in a better socio-economic situation are two different phenomena. Friends or
acquaintances can provide help in the case of worsening health. Social networks thus present one reason
to remain in the city despite the hukou, a legislative incentive to leave, and regardless of the individual’s
health.
Social integration has a very strong significant effect on healthcare access, with a marginal effect of
about 60%. We also find that having friends or acquaintances acts as a significant positive factor in
healthcare access, with a marginal effect of 67.3%.
On the selected sample, the social network also explains healthcare access. In Model A, we find that
having friends or acquaintances acts as a significant positive factor in healthcare access. This positive
and significant effect of social networks echoes that in Model B. The marginal effect here is 45%. One of
the main results of this paper is then the importance of the network and social capital on the healthcare
access of migrant workers. Networks act as a push factor in determining healthcare access. Despite the
”hukou”, they allow migrants to obtain access to healthcare.
Table 6, Columns (4) and (5) display results on the non-exogeneity of the effect of health insurance
on healthcare access. Instrumented health insurance actually has no significant effect on healthcare
access (Columns (6)). Therefore, the negative effect of the life-condition indices on healthcare access is
consistent with both the selected sample (Model A) and the results in Model B.
14We do not present the results controlling for ”the way in which the migrant obtained their job”, family structure and
the ownership of durable goods as none of the estimated coefficients were significant, and their inclusion does not change
the other results.
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7 Conclusion
This paper uses data from the Survey of Rural Migrant Workers Health and Social-economic Status in
2006, covering five cities in China: Chongqing, Dalian, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Wuhan. These five cities
are among the most industrialized with the most rural migrant workers. They represent China’s five
geographical regions with their respective economic characters. Using this dataset, the results highlight
two exclusion factors: a financial factor (income) and a legislative factor (the hukou). We present new
evidence on the determinants of healthcare access for migrant workers. While, as expected, financial
support is one of the key factors, another is the social network and the feeling of being socially integrated.
This shed lights on the ability of social networks to tackle exclusion from healthcare access.
There is no national-level health insurance system in China. The right to healthcare insurance and
other benefits depends on a permanent residence registration system, the ”hukou”. Individuals are only
supposed to claim for medical care benefits in the location where they are registered. Therefore, not only
are migrants excluded from urban public health insurance, but they also have to return to their place of
registration in order to take advantage of rural public health insurance. Due to these legislative factors,
migrants are excluded from healthcare access in their workplace. In addition, in Chinese hospitals, family
and relatives play a crucial role during treatment, as hospitals provide only a poor level of accommodation
and catering. When someone is in hospital, relatives need to be present to support the patient with
meals and helping with their treatment, and the presence of relatives is indeed an important element
in the way in which individuals recover. Hence, both the hukou and the need for family support in
hospitals push migrants to return to their place of registration. However, this ”push factor” is softened
by the organization of the Chinese health system, where hospital quality differs according to the level of
urbanization, with cities offering the best healthcare quality. Those with severe health conditions will
have access to adequate healthcare quality in a city hospital. Staying in the city may be the best option
for these migrant workers. In this paper, we thus distinguish two models of healthcare access according
to the gravity of the health condition.
As long as migrants do not consider their health problems to be an issue in terms of doing their job,
they may ignore them. When the gravity of their condition becomes an issue for their work, they react.
Reacting does not necessarily mean a visit to a Doctor in their place of work. As noted above, the hukou
excludes them from healthcare access, and they may then return to their hometown. As our survey is
conducted in the workplace, these returning migrant workers do not appear in this survey. This selection
bias appears clearly in our empirical results. Migrants who can afford to return to their hometown and
who still have contact in their hometown, do indeed return there.
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Apart from residency permits and income, we last show that social networks (having friends or ac-
quaintances) stands out as a significant determinant of healthcare access. This highlights the importance
of migrants’ networks for healthcare access. Feeling socially integrated also has a strong positive effect
on healthcare access for migrant workers with poor health. As such, social integration seems to be a key
factor influencing healthcare access. But what about those who cannot afford to return to the hometown
and those who no longer have contact with relatives in their hometown? Should they stay out of the
healthcare system in their workplace without any other perspectives? Targeting this population will
allow to define the specificity of this population (the younger tier, the older tier, the female ones?) and
to establish an adequate healthcare-access policy.
In this paper, we use data from migrants selected by their work unit. These migrants have formal
jobs and are in a regular and non-critical situation. Here, we do not study the bottom of the migrant
population. Our results thus give then a much less critical picture than the reality. However, we have
already identified some difficult situations even in this more rosy picture. Implementing an adequate and
efficient health policy would then seem to be a priority.
One efficient policy to improve migrants’ healthcare access in China would be to focus on improving
their social integration in the city in which they work. One way is to build up migrants’ social capital
by improving their networks. The resident committee may be the perfect vector for such a policy.
Resident committees are defined at the neighborhood level in urban areas in China, and are the place
where nominated residents manage neighborhood affairs and state-citizen interactions. To data, migrants
have not always been well-integrated in these committees, even if they have a ”real” house. Therefore,
encouraging committees to include migrants could be a good way of improving their healthcare access.
We have shown the importance of integration for migrants’ healthcare access. However, we have not
explained the mechanism behind this result. It would be of interest to determine the channel through
which integration affects healthcare access: via better information, for example? Via interactions with
local workers influencing the behavior of migrant workers? It is also important to know whether this
integration process only affect healthcare access, or other domains of life as well, such as children’s
education.
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8 Appendix
Figure 1: The change in public health expenditure in China 1980-2000 as a percentage of GDP
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The health indicator called Health1 in the data is created according to Fan Ming’s 2002 book. There
are six questions which Fan Ming weights; the indicator is equal to the weighted sum of these variables.
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The health indicator called Health2 in the data is the unweighted sum of the answers to the health
questions. See the Table below for more details;
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
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Table 5: Healthcare Access
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Good/Fair Health 0.216** 0.214** 0.232** 0.234** 0.240**
(0.0990) (0.0992) (0.0996) (0.0998) (0.105)
Bad health 0.577*** 0.575*** 0.596*** 0.590*** 0.706***
(0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.197)
Very bad health 0.632*** 0.634*** 0.677*** 0.675*** 0.615**
(0.242) (0.242) (0.245) (0.245) (0.251)
Gender 0.200** 0.197** 0.279*** 0.267*** 0.250**
(0.0942) (0.0950) (0.0971) (0.0974) (0.101)
Age (30-40) 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.371*** 0.356*** 0.345***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.115)
Age over 40 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.504*** 0.475*** 0.452***
(0.153) (0.157) (0.154) (0.158) (0.160)
Junior School -0.119 -0.186 -0.174
(0.161) (0.163) (0.165)
High School -0.0627 -0.181 -0.149
(0.175) (0.179) (0.183)
College 0.500 0.272 0.327
(0.311) (0.327) (0.337)
Log(Income) 0.472*** 0.458*** 0.397***
(0.129) (0.133) (0.140)
Log(Remittances) 0.0311**
(0.0128)
Health Ins. -0.113 -0.139 -0.175 -0.181 -0.238**
(0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.114)
Number of provinces 5 5 5 5 5
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Healthcare Access for bad health conditions (Model A)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.229** 0.227** 0.241** 0.146 0.145 0.100
(0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.113) (0.113) (0.107)
Age (30-40) 0.233* 0.232* 0.210* 0.00881 0.00905 0.00515
(0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.137) (0.137) (0.131)
Age over 40 0.370** 0.370** 0.305* 0.228 0.233 0.327*
(0.172) (0.172) (0.175) (0.183) (0.183) (0.174)
Junior school -0.350* -0.351* -0.355** -0.481*** -0.482*** -0.456**
(0.180) (0.180) (0.181) (0.187) (0.187) (0.179)
High school -0.344* -0.345* -0.337* -0.461** -0.459** -0.474**
(0.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.206) (0.206) (0.199)
College 0.133 0.132 0.103 0.0162 0.0160 0.0478
(0.356) (0.356) (0.358) (0.364) (0.364) (0.353)
Log(Income) 0.372** 0.371** 0.329** 0.121 0.118 0.103
(0.150) (0.150) (0.154) (0.164) (0.164) (0.158)
Log(Remittance) 0.0385*** 0.0385*** 0.0396*** 0.0494*** 0.0494*** 0.0482***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0133)
Health Ins. -0.308** -0.314** -0.305** -0.338*** -0.336*** 0.133*†
(0.120) (0.126) (0.125) (0.130) (0.130) (0.076)
NCMS 0.0958 0.0596 0.00852
(0.128) (0.130) (0.123)
Construction Ind. 0.472** 0.561** 0.566** 0.622***
(0.218) (0.223) (0.223) (0.220)
Manufacturing Ind. 0.171 0.161 0.166 0.210
(0.151) (0.154) (0.154) (0.146)
State-owned firm 0.0239 0.0135 0.0156 -0.0173
(0.181) (0.185) (0.185) (0.181)
Continued on next page
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Model A continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collective firm 0.192 0.119 0.118 0.115
(0.218) (0.222) (0.222) (0.210)
Foreign and JV firm 0.107 0.0903 0.0830 -0.102
(0.182) (0.186) (0.185) (0.188)
Fixed-term contract -0.0655 -0.0668 -0.151
(0.117) (0.117) (0.112)
Clothing expenditures -0.191 -0.192 -0.214*
(0.136) (0.136) (0.128)
Transport. expenditures -0.503*** -0.506*** -0.460***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.176)
Education expenditures -0.461*** -0.458*** -0.417***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.146)
House expenditures -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.386***
(0.119) (0.119) (0.114)
Acquaintances 0.380*** 0.384*** 0.372***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.125)
Feeling socially integrated 0.0633 0.0614 0.0234
(0.111) (0.110) (0.105)
Ins*Dalian 0.0654
(0.401)
IV Model
Number of province 5 5 5 5 5 5
Ref: migrants who are illiterate or with an elementary level of education, working in the
Service Industry, in a large private Chinese firm.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
†: Instrumented variable validated by a Hausman test
Controlling for within variation in health status using Health2
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Table 7: Healthcare Access for Severe Health Conditions (Model B)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.543* 0.555* 0.705** 0.848** 0.852** 0.852**
(0.318) (0.321) (0.334) (0.352) (0.352) (0.339)
Age (30-40) 1.271*** 1.292*** 1.220*** 0.905** 0.905** 1.008**
(0.364) (0.369) (0.378) (0.428) (0.429) (0.414)
Age over 40 0.950** 0.983** 0.722 0.874 0.877 1.021**
(0.462) (0.464) (0.480) (0.545) (0.544) (0.514)
Junior school 0.730* 0.805* 0.713 0.536 0.544 0.702
(0.436) (0.443) (0.458) (0.488) (0.488) (0.479)
High school 1.069** 1.032* 1.133** 0.903 0.922 0.939*
(0.532) (0.533) (0.551) (0.576) (0.573) (0.561)
College 1.648 1.324 1.888 1.678 1.671 1.714
(1.254) (1.224) (1.271) (1.272) (1.273) (1.277)
Log(Income) 0.771* 0.755* 0.906** 0.986** 0.996** 0.740
(0.403) (0.403) (0.436) (0.467) (0.467) (0.457)
Log(Remittance) -0.0272 -0.0236 -0.0336 -0.0371 -0.0363 -0.0469
(0.0394) (0.0398) (0.0406) (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0414)
Health Ins. 0.357 0.0620 0.851* 0.913* 0.892* 0.919*†
(0.393) (0.421) (0.453) (0.478) (0.474) (0.530)
NCMS -0.124 -0.130 -0.0702
(0.383) (0.410) (0.384)
Construction Ind. 0.471 0.546 0.550 0.380
(0.695) (0.719) (0.720) (0.687)
Manufacturing Ind. -0.186 -0.224 -0.226 0.00424
(0.449) (0.479) (0.479) (0.446)
State-owned firm 1.311** 1.274** 1.257** 0.797
(0.582) (0.588) (0.585) (0.549)
Continued on next page
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Model B continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collective firm 0.267 0.292 0.287 0.294
(0.599) (0.618) (0.618) (0.573)
Foreign and JV firm -0.622 -0.431 -0.434 -0.657
(0.469) (0.493) (0.493) (0.495)
Fixed-term contract -0.200 -0.180 -0.315
(0.344) (0.338) (0.352)
Clothing expenditures 0.545 0.551 0.607
(0.405) (0.404) (0.390)
Transport expenditures -1.628** -1.619** -1.464**
(0.783) (0.781) (0.669)
Education expenditures 0.543 0.542 0.305
(0.448) (0.448) (0.432)
House expenditures 0.227 0.224 0.0628
(0.329) (0.329) (0.322)
Acquaintances 0.274 0.262 0.322*
(0.410) (0.409) (0.166)
Feeling socially integrated 0.529* 0.531* 0.473*
(0.319) (0.318) (0.256)
Ins*Dalian 2.071**
(1.041)
IV Model
Number of province 5 5 5 5 5 5
Ref: migrants who are illiterate or with an elementary level of education, working in the
Service Industry, in a large private Chinese firm.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ref: Works in the Service Industry, in a large private Chinese firm
†: Instrumented variable validated by a Hausman test
Controlling for within variation in health status using Health2
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